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Abstract
Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overcondence. In par-
ticular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better than
average. The literature takes for granted that this better-than-average e¤ect is prob-
lematic. We argue, however, that, even accepting these studies completely on their own
terms, there is nothing at all wrong with a strict majority of people rating themselves
above the median.
When it comes to overcondence, there is a consensus on a consensus: writers agree that
researchers have found overcondence to be common. Typical comments include Dozens of
studies show that people...are generally overcondent about their relative skills(Camerer,
1997), Perhaps the most robust nding in the psychology of judgment is that people are
overcondent (DeBondt and Thaler, 1995), and The tendency to evaluate oneself more
favorably than others is a staple nding in social psychology(Alicke et al. 1995). While
the study of overcondence originated in the psychology literature, the phenomenon has
migrated into the economics and nance literature, taking its place in the growing list of
irrationalaspects of human attitudes and behaviour that were once on the fringes but are
now on the forefront of mainstream thinking.1
We thank Stefano Sacchetto for his research assistance. We also thank Ariel Rubinstein, Rafael Di Tella,
Federico Echenique, Emilio Espino, PJ Healy, Richard Lowery, Henry Moon, Don Moore, Nigel Nicholson,
Luís Santos-Pinto, and Madan Pilutlla for their comments.
1Papers on overcondence in economics include Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Garcia, Sangiorgi and Uro-
sevic (2007), Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005), Koszegi (2006), Menkho¤ et al. (2006), Noth and Weber (2003),
Van den Steen (2004), Zabojnik (2004). In nance, recent (published) papers include Barber and Odean
(2001), Biais et al. (2005), Bernardo and Welch (2001), Chuang and Lee (2006), Daniel, Hirshleifer and
Subrahmanyam (2001), Kyle and Wang (1997), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Peng and Xiong (2006), Wang
(2001).
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If people are indeed overcondent there are important implications for our understanding
of the economy and for public policy. For instance, a basic principle of competition is that
rms will enter an industry only up to the point that they earn zero expected prots. But
if, to take one industry, restaurateurs overestimate their abilities, we can expect too many
restaurants to open only to close shortly thereafter, and the restaurant business to lose
money on average. At the same time, if people overestimate their driving ability, then
merely informing them of general risks will not induce them to take su¢ cient care.
Overcondence has been reported in peoplesbeliefs in the precision of their estimates,
in their beliefs about the likelihood their answers to questions are correct, and in their
appraisal of their relative skills and virtues. In this paper, we are concerned with the last
form of overcondence.2 As Myers (1999; p:57) writes, on nearly any dimension that is
both subjective and socially desirable, most will see themselves as better than average.As
evidence, he cites research showing that most people perceive themselves as more intelligent
than their average peer, most business managers rate their performance as better than their
average fellow manager, and most high school students rate themselves as more original
than the average high-schooler. In an oft-quoted study, Svenson found that 77% of Swedish
subjects felt they were safer drivers than the median, and 69% felt they were more skillful.
These ndings, and others like them, are typically cited as evidence of overcondence, at
least in peoplesestimation of their relative skills, without any explanation as to why such
data is indicative of mistaken self-appraisals. For instance, Alicke et al. (1995) simply
assert that the better-than-average e¤ect provides compelling evidence that people maintain
unrealistically positive images of themselves relative to others[italics added]. Presumably,
the reason for the lack of explanation is that, since it is logically impossible for most people
to be better than average(Taylor and Brown (1988)), it seems obvious that some people
must be making errors in their self-evaluations. But the simple truism that most people
cannot be better than average more precisely, the median does not imply that most
people cannot rationally rate themselves above average. Indeed, we will show that none of
the evidence cited above is evidence of unrealistically positive images at all. This is true
even if we accept the evidence described on its own terms (and do not, for example, argue
that subjects misunderstood the questions or disagreed in their interpretations). Failure to
recognize this fact comes from a failure to frame the issue of overcondence precisely.
To illustrate the main point of this paper, consider a large population with three types
of drivers, low skilled, medium skilled, and high skilled, and suppose that the probabilities
of any one of them causing an accident in any single period are pL = 45 ; pM =
2
5
; and pH = 0,
2Some authors, such as Burson et al. (2005) reserve the term overcondencefor people who overestimate
their absolute abilities, but we see no reason for this restriction. In any case, the literarture uses the term
in all the ways we have listed, and more.
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respectively. In period 0, nature chooses a skill level for each person with equal probability.
Initially no driver knows his or her own skill level, and so each person (rationally) evaluates
himself as no better or worse than average. In period 1, everyone drives and learns something
about his skill, based upon whether or not he has caused an accident. Each person is then
asked how his driving skill compares to the rest of the population. How does a driver who
has not caused an accident reply?
Using Bayesrule, he evaluates his own skill level as follows:
p (High skill j No accident) =
1
3
1
3
+ 1
3
3
5
+ 1
3
1
5
=
5
9
p (Medium skill j No accident) =
1
3
3
5
1
3
+ 1
3
3
5
+ 1
3
1
5
=
1
3
p (Low skill j No accident) =
1
3
1
5
1
3
+ 1
3
3
5
+ 1
3
1
5
=
1
9
Such a driver thinks there is over a 1
2
chance (in fact, 5
9
) that his skill level is in the top third
of all drivers. His mean probability of an accident is 5
9
0 + 1
3
2
5
+ 1
9
4
5
= 2
9
, which is better than
for 2
3
of the drivers, and better than the population mean. Furthermore, his beliefs about
himself strictly rst order stochastically dominate the population distribution. Any way he
looks at it, a driver who has not had an accident should evaluate himself as better than
average. Since 3
5
of drivers have not had an accident, 3
5
rank themselves better than average.
Thus, the population of drivers seems overcondent on the whole. However, rather than
being overcondent, which implies some error in their judgements, they are simply using all
the information available to them in the best possible manner.
We emphasize that in this paper, we do not provide an explanation for overcondence.
Quite the contrary, we show that, as in the above driving example, much of the supposed
evidence for overcondence does not indicate overcondence at all; the apparent overcon-
dence may be an illusion. At the same time, we do not argue that people are, in fact, not
overcondent. Rather, we argue that better-than-average data does not provide evidence
one way or the other. Thus, for example, a nding that 80% of the people in a population
rate themselves as above median intelligence does not work against the null hypothesis that
no one su¤ers from overcondence.
Missing from the discussion in the literature has been the recognition that when people
rank themselves, their rankings are just summary statistics which provide only limited infor-
mation about the entire distributions of their beliefs. In the above driving example, although
the statement 3
5
of the people rank themselves above averageappears to be problematic,
an examination of the complete beliefs of the population shows that there is no anomaly.
Indeed, since the 2
5
of the population that do cause an accident have beliefs I am low skill
with probability 2
3
, medium with probability 1
3
, and high with probability 0,the beliefs of
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the population average out to the actual population distribution, as they should.
We will also show that not only can a majority of people rationally rank themselves above
the median, but, depending upon the denitions one adopts, even 99% of the population can
rank itself in the top 1% without any cognitive error being implied. Moreover, the failure
to properly frame the issue has led authors to make plausible sounding statements that are
simply wrong, such as Camerers (1997, p. 173) claim that two rms cannot both think they
are each more likely to have the most skill (assuming a common prior). We will return to
Camerers claim in Section 1.3.
In some experiments, subjects are asked to take actions, rather than answer questions.
Overcondence is then inferred from their actions. But actions, too, provide only a summary
statistic of beliefs, and the same errors that have been made in interpreting answers to
questionnaires have been made in interpreting the actions that subjects take.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we provide a careful
framework for analyzing overcondence. We distinguish between apparent overcondence,
which gives a possibly misleading impression of overcondence (as in the above driving
example), and (true) overcondence. We show that much of the evidence in the literature
purporting to show overcondence does nothing of the sort. At the same time, we identify
two types of evidence that can show overcondence (Theorems 3 and 6). In this section,
we analyze experiments in which subjects are asked to evaluate themselves. In Section 2 we
look at two papers in which subjects are asked to take actions, rather than make statements.
Using the framework developed in Section 1, we show that the experiments in these papers
do not provide proper tests of overcondence. In Section 3 we suggest two experiments that
do provide a proper test of overcondence.
Recent work has challenged the universality of the nding that most people rate them-
selves as above average. In particular, there is evidence that this e¤ect is attenuated when
the attribute under consideration is objectively measurable, and even reversed when the skill
under consideration is a di¢ cult one to master. In Section 4 we provide an explanation for
these ndings. In Section 5 we discuss why it is important to distinguish between apparent
overcondence and overcondence. In Section 6 we present some evindence on our approach.
In Section 7 we review some of the literature. Section 8 is the conclusion.
1 Questionnaires
Consider a person who asserts I am very intelligent.How are we to tell whether or not this
condence is merited? It may well be impossible, given the vagueness of the term very.
Suppose that instead the person asserts I am more intelligent than most people. The
concept more than most is clearer than very, but the statement remains di¢ cult to
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assess, since it is unclear how to measure intelligence, IQ tests notwithstanding.
Researchers have attempted to surmount these di¢ culties by considering entire popula-
tions at once. The idea is that, while it may be di¢ cult to judge whether or not a specic
individual is overcondent, it may be possible to determine that a population is overcondent
on the whole. For instance, if everyone in a room asserts I am denitely the most intelligent
person in this room, it could be concluded that all but one of them is overcondent, at least
in their evaluations of their relative abilities3 (and assuming that they agree on what consti-
tutes intelligence). Note that for many economic problems, these types of relative rankings
are the relevant ones. For instance, the wisdom of attempting a career as a professional
football player depends on a persons ability relative to other would-be footballers.
This research can be divided into two types: work that proceeds by means of question-
naires and work that asks subjects to take actions. We consider the questionnaire work rst,
and subdivide this work into two categories, one ordinal and one cardinal:
1. Ranking questionnaires: People are asked to rank themselves relative to others on some
attribute (I am more intelligent than 80% of the people in this room).
2. Scale questionnaires: People are asked to compare themselves to the population on a
scale (On a scale of  5 (much less intelligent than average) to 5 (much more intelligent
than average), I am a 3.
We consider the ranking literature rst.
1.1 Ranking Questions
Svensons (1981) work is a prototypical example of a ranking questionnaire. Svenson gathered
subjects into a room and presented them with the following instructions (among others):
We would like to know about what you think about how safely you drive an
automobile. All drivers are not equally safe drivers. We want you to compare
your own skill to the skills of the other people in this experiment. By denition,
there is a least safe and a most safe driver in this room. We want you to indicate
your own estimated position in this experimental group. Of course, this is a
di¢ cult question because you do not know all the people gathered here today,
much less how safely they drive. But please make the most accurate estimate
you can.
3Each individual may or may not also have an overated opinion of his absolute level of intelligence. In
fact, individuals may not even have a clear notion of what this absolute level is.
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Each subject was then asked to place himself or herself into a safety decile. In one respect,
Svenson was very careful. Realizing that the subjects had little information about the other
drivers in the room, he explicitly stated: Of course, this is a di¢ cult question because you
do not know all the people gathered here today, much less how safely they drive. But there
is another aspect he left unaddressed: Does a driver know how safely he himself drives? Of
course, a driver has more information about himself than about a stranger (for instance, he
knows the number of accidents he has had), but there is no reason to presume that he knows
precisely how safe his driving is4 (even assuming that he knows exactly what it means to
drive safely5). This raises the question of what exactly a respondent means when he ranks
himself as being, say, in the 7th decile of drivers when it comes to safety.
To isolate the nature of the problem, let us consider a more carefully delineated problem.
Suppose a subject is asked to rank her reaction time. She is told that reaction time is
measured to the nearest tenth of a second, and that it varies in the general population
uniformly from 1 second to 0:1 seconds, so that, for instance, a time of :3 seconds places
a person in the 8th decile (smaller reaction times are better). She is asked to estimate her
position in the population. Suppose that her beliefs about her own reaction time are given
by Chart I below (she estimates that with probability 0:16 her reaction time is :5 seconds,
with probability 0:2 her reaction time is :4 seconds, etc...). The chart also lists population
deciles.
Reaction Time 1 :9 :8 :7 :6 :5 :4 :3 :2 :1
Prob. own time 0 0 0 0:16 0:16 0:16 0:20 0:30 0:02 0
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Chart I
In what decile will she place herself? Three reasonable answers immediately come to
mind, corresponding to three common notions of average.
() She can reasonably place herself in the 7th decile. After all, there is over a 50% chance
that her reaction time will be :4 or better, and this is the fastest time for which she
can make such a claim. Another way of saying this is that :4 is the median of her
distribution, and this places her in the 7th decile .
() She can reasonably place herself in the 6th decile. After, all :462 is her mean reaction
time, which rounds up to :5 which is in the 6th decile.
4Many authors explicitly acknowledge that people are not likely to be certain of their skill levels. Thus,
Alicke et al. (1995) ask subjects to make point estimatesof their skill, while Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005)
note that a subject in their experiment has only some idea of his skills in it. However, these and other
authors do not fully explore the implications of this uncertainty.
5Dunning et. al (1989) argue that people may have di¤erent notions of what it means to drive safely, so
that the data is not what it appears to be. Here, we give the best case for the data and assume that all
subjects agree on the meaning of a safe driver.
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() She can reasonably place herself in the 8th decile. After all, her modal time :3 places
her in the 8th decile.
Certainly, this list is not exhaustive. Thus, when a person places herself in a certain
decile, we, as researchers, have no real way of knowing the signicance of her answer. Is
there a corrector rationalanswer? No; she is being asked to summarize her beliefs with
a single parameter, but no single reply supplies the best information for all circumstances.
For instance, if she is risk-neutral, and we are interested in knowing whether she would place
an even money bet that her reaction time is better than that of x% of the population, then
her median belief provides the requisite information. On the other hand, if we would like
to know whether she would place a bet where she receives a payment based on how much
faster or slower she is than other people, her mean answer may be more informative. If she
is not risk-neutral, then no single parameter may be of much use.
Returning to Svensons driving question, a person may consider herself to be quite a
safe and skillful driver since she has never had an accident and always manoeuvres well in
tra¢ c, but at the same time realize that her limited experience restricts her ability to make
a precise self-appraisal. In ranking herself, she must estimate her own ability as well as that
of the others in the room. As a result, it is unclear what to make of her answer to Svensons
question and, hence, of Svensons data. Rather than ascribe a particular meaning, we will
consider several possibilities.
1.1.1 Population Median Data
Consider a population where each person is asked to rank his or her skill level relative to the
other people in the population. (We use the word skillloosely here to denote the attribute
under consideration.) The literature is not always very careful in dening when this popu-
lation displays overcondence (or, equivalently for this paper, when the population displays
the so-called better-than-average e¤ect), but the general idea is that there is overcondence
if, as Myers (1999; p:57) writes, most people see themselves as better than average.
An immediate di¢ culty with this formulation is the ambiguity in the notion of average
does this refer to the mean or the median? It is easy to see that the mean cannot possibly
provide the right denition, at least when the underlying trait distribution may be skewed.
For example, in a population of ten people, one who has scored 0 on a test and nine who
have scored 50, the nine have, in fact, performed better than the mean, so there is certainly
nothing wrong in them believing that they have. Thus, Denition 1 below, which uses the
median, is what the literature has in mind, whether explicitly or implicitly.6
6For instance, Hoelzl and Rustichini say that a population exhibits overcondence if a majority of people
estimates their skills or abilities to be better than the median.
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Given a set of individuals who are asked to rank themselves, let population median data
x be the fraction of people who rank themselves strictly above the median.
Denition 1 Population median data x is apparently overcondent if x > 1
2
.
The reader will have noticed that we have used the word apparently in the above
denition. To understand the reason, we must ask why a population that ranks itself highly
on average should be called overcondent, rather than simply condent. Clearly, the idea
is that in an overcondent population there is something incorrect, or at the very least
inconsistent, in peoples self-evaluations. To determine if a population that is apparently
overcondent is truly overcondent, we need a notion of what it means for peoples self-
evaluations to be correct and consistent. Fortunately, we have such a notion readily available,
given by the Harsanyi common prior approach in which nature picks a skill level, or type,
for each person, and over time each person receives information about her type and updates
her beliefs about herself using Bayesrule. We formalize this below.
Denition 2 A signalling structure is a triplet  = (S;; f), where S is a set of signals,
  R is a type space, and f = ffg2 is a collection of probability distributions over S:
If, for example, S is nite, f (s) is the probability that a person of type  receives the
signal s.
 Throughout this paper we interpret higher types as more skillful.
Denition 3 A signalling model consists of a population of individuals and a signalling
structure  = (S;; f) such that:
i) In period 0, nature picks a type  2  for each individual, resulting in some distribution
p; initially, each persons belief about her own type is given by this distribution.
ii) In period 1, an individual of type  receives a signal s 2 S according to the probability
distribution f; each person updates her initial belief using Bayesrule.
This denition of a signalling model reects a standard approach to a situation of incom-
plete information.7 Although it is not necessary for us, we posit that each individual knows
the distribution of types in the population. On the one hand, this is certainly a plausible
condition. For instance, an individual might know the distribution of the number of acci-
dents a person can expect to have in a lifetime, or the distribution of IQs in the population,
7In the literature, it is often assumed that nature chooses a type for each person independently. Imposing
this restriction would not modify our results.
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without knowing either gure for herself.8 More importantly, this condition makes our task
more di¢ cult: we will show that apparently overcondent data can rationally arise, even
if everyone has a perfect understanding of the level of skills in the population. Note that,
although it is not explicit in the denition of a signalling model, a dynamic time structure
is allowed. In particular, the signal that an individual receives in period 1may consist of
various pieces of information obtained over time (for instance, from her driving experience).
This is quite a rational model; indeed for many it is the denition of full rationality. As
such, it provides a proper foundation for judging the rationality of a population. Note that
since agents in a signalling model use Bayesrule, for a large population their beliefs average
out to the (true) population distribution.
The following proposition indicates that apparent overcondence is incompatible with
rationality when people know their skill levels exactly.
Proposition 1 Consider a signaling model. If everybodys updated beliefs after receiving
their signals are degenerate, the population median data cannot be apparently overcondent.
Proof. All proofs not in the text are in the appendix
If people are certain of their types, then a strict majority of them cannot rationally believe
they are strictly better than the median.9 However, this certainty is a rather implausible
condition in most, if not all, situations each person will have only an imperfect indication
of his own skill.10 How imperfect can a rational personsself-knowledge be? A priori, it
seems di¢ cult to require more of a rational population than that its members derive their
beliefs in a rational and consistent manner; that is, that they derive them from a signalling
model.11
In ranking questionnaires, people do not report their full beliefs, but only a ranking.
Rational and consistent individuals report rankings that come from beliefs that are derived
from a signalling model; however, as discussed in the previous section, there are many
legitimate ways to report a ranking derived from a particular belief. Therefore, in interpreting
ranking data we need to consider several possibilities.
8In experiments, the comparison population is sometimes the group of subjects in the room. Even if
a subject knows the skill distribution in the general population (or relevant subpopulation, for instance,
students), he may not know the distribution of skills in the room. However, the best case for the validity of
an experiment is when the subject group is large enough to be representative of the larger population.
9Propostion 1 remains true if we modify the denition of a signalling model to allow people to be uncertain
of the population distribution. For instance, nature could pick one of several population distributions with
probabilities that are common knowledge.
10As Benabou and Tirole (2002) write, The psychology literature generally views introspection as quite
inaccurate (Nisbett and Wilson (1977)), and stresses that learning about oneself is an ongoing process.
11We might further ask that this signalling model be, in some sense, reasonable. We explore this issue in
Section 1.1.3.
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Suppose that people use their median beliefs about themselves in their self-evaluations (as
in  of Section 1.1). The next denition says that a fraction x can rationally and consistently
report themselves as being better than the population median, if, starting from a common
prior, and using Bayesrule, a fraction x can come to believe their median type is better
than the population median. To avoid ambiguities, we require that the distribution of types
has a unique median.
Denition 4 Population median data x can be -rationalized if there exists a signalling
model in which the distribution of types has a unique median and x is the expected fraction of
people who will believe that their median type is strictly greater than the population median,
after receiving their signals and updating.
More formally, x can be -rationalized if there exists a signalling model as follows: Let
m be the median of the prior p. Let Smed  S be the set of signals such that an individual
who receives a signal s 2 Smed has a median belief about himself that is strictly greater than
the (unique) population median. Thus, s 2 Smed if and only if P (  m j s) < 12 : Let F
denote the probability distribution of the signals in S, often called the marginal. That is,
for each (measurable) T  S let
F (T ) =
Z

Z
T
df (s) dp ()
Then, x can be -rationalized if x = F (Smed).
In a stochastic environment it is possible to explaina wide range of experimental data
as the outcome of a random, although possibly unlikely, process. Denition 4 avoids this
cheatby insisting that the data x be the expected fraction of people who believe themselves
to be above average. This can also be interpreted as restricting ourselves to data that comes
from large populations.12 Thus, Denition 4 is a demanding notion of rationalizing. When
people self-evaluate using their median types and the data can be -rationalized, there is no
prima facie case for calling it overcondent.
The following denition is for a population in which people use their mean beliefs about
themselves (as in  of Section 1.1) for their self-evaluations.
Denition 5 Population median data x can be -rationalized if there exists a signalling
model in which the distribution of types has a unique median and x is the expected fraction
of people who will believe that their mean type is strictly greater than the population median,
after receiving their signals and updating.
12In Section 1.3 we briey discuss small populations, where more extreme data can be rationalized.
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Although reporting a modal belief strikes us as a plausible way to answer a questionnaire,
it also strikes us as less compelling than reporting either a median or a mean belief. Therefore,
in the interest of space, from now on we no longer consider mode reports. (Considering mode
reports would not modify our results in any essential way.) Instead, we turn to a slightly
di¤erent approach than the one we have adopted so far.
It is reasonable for a person with no information about herself, other than that she is
a random member of the population, to rate herself as average.13 Suppose the person now
receives a signal that causes her beliefs about her own type to strictly rst order stochastically
dominate the population distribution. It is natural for this person to now rank herself above
the median person.14 This leads to the following denition.
Denition 6 Population median data x can be -rationalized if there exists a signalling
model in which the distribution of types has a unique median and x is the expected fraction
of people who, after receiving their signals and updating, will have beliefs about their own
type that strictly rst order stochastically dominate the population distribution.
The existing literature assumes that apparent overcondence implies cognitive errors,
or inconsistencies, on the part of (some) respondents without considering the meaning of
their replies. In our terms, the literature assumes that apparent overcondence implies that
the data cannot be rationalized without specifying which sense of rationalizing. In some
cases, there may be a reason to focus on a particular sense (as in Section 2.2). Absent such
a reason, a stringent denition of overcondence requires that population median data be
called overcondent only when it cannot be rationalized using any of the above concepts, for
only then can we be sure that there is a problemwith the data15; a lax denition requires
only that data be called overcondent when it cannot be rationalized using at least one of
the concepts.16
13A person who has no private information about herself and who self-evaluates using the median of her
type, ranks herself as equal to the population median; if she uses her mean type, she ranks herself as equal to
the population median if the prior is symmetric, but not necessarily otherwise (which may be an argument
against the reasonableness of the mean).
14Note, however, that if the population distribution is not symmetric, the fact that a persons beliefs about
herself strictly rst order stochastically dominate the population distribution does not imply that either her
median or mean type is strictly better than the population median type.
15In fact, even then we could not be sure as there could be still other reasonable ways for people to evaluate
themselves. Morevover, although in the interest of space, we have assumed that the entire population self-
evaluates in the same way, nothing precludes di¤erent people using di¤erent ways. For instance, 13 of the
population could self-evaluate with their mean type and 23 with their median type.
16It is the data (i.e., the evidence at hand) which we are dening as overcondent, or not, rather than the
population. Note, for instance, that even a group of people that is apparently undercondent could, in fact,
be overcondent if they are ranking themselves more highly than a rational appraisal of their life experiences
would justify (although it might be di¢ cult, or impossible, for an analyst to determine this).
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Denition 7 Population median data x is strongly overcondent if it is apparently over-
condent and it cannot be -rationalized, and cannot be -rationalized, and cannot be -
rationalized.
Denition 8 Population median data x is weakly overcondent if it is apparently over-
condent and it cannot be -rationalized, or it cannot be -rationalized, or it cannot be
-rationalized.
In a symmetric signalling model, the population distribution is symmetric.17 In what
follows, we note when the data can (also) be rationalized by a symmetric signalling model
(and hence the rationalizing does not depend upon a discrepancy between the mean and
median).
The following theorem shows that population median data cannot prove even the weak
version of overcondence.
Theorem 1 Apparent overcondence of population median data x implies weak overcon-
dence only if x = 1. Put di¤erently, it is possible to -rationalize, and -rationalize, and
-rationalize any fraction x 2 [1
2
; 1) of the population rating themselves above the median.
Moreover, these rationalizations can be done with symmetric signalling models.
Theorem 1 shows that when people have imperfect information about their skills, and
receive information about these skills over time, there is nothing wrong with a strict majority
of them ranking themselves above the median. Thus, apparent overcondence should not
be used as an indication of overcondence. For instance, Svensons (1981) nding that a
majority of subjects regarded themselves as more skillful and less risky than the average
driveris unproblematic. Note that Theorem 1 restricts x to be greater than 1
2
only because
we are concentrating on overcondence. The theorem remains true for all x 2 (0; 1), so that
apparent undercondence is also not problematic. Although the three notions of rationalizing
used in Theorem 1 are independent of each other, the drivers example in the introduction
illustrates the theorem for all three.
The above theorem concerns a population of individuals who place themselves relative to
the median person. The next theorem is even more dramatic: almost everyone can rationally
believe that their mean skill level is strictly higher than the skill level of any fraction of the
population (even if the population distribution is symmetric).
Theorem 2 Data in which any fraction x 2 (0; 1) of the population ranks itself strictly
higher than any fraction q 2 (0; 1) of the population can be -rationalized by a signalling
model. In particular, 99% of the people can rationally believe that their mean skill level is
17If P is the distribution, and h is the midpoint of the support , P (  h  y) = P (  h+ y) for all y.
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strictly higher than the skill level of 99% of the people. Moreover, this rationalizing can be
done with a symmetric signalling model.
1.1.2 Population Ranking Data
Although the results of ranking experiments are typically summarized by the number of
people who rank themselves above the median, most of these experiments collect more de-
tailed data, such as the deciles into which subjects place themselves. While the previous
section shows that population median data is essentially useless for determining whether or
not people are overcondent, this more complete data is potentially helpful.
Suppose that each person is asked to place himself into a k-cile, where to be in the jth k-
cile means that the person ranks himself strictly above the fraction j 1
k
of the population, but
not strictly above the fraction j
k
.18 Population ranking data is a vector x 2 Rk; Pk1 xi = 1,
where xi, i = 1; :::; k is the fraction of people who rank themselves in the ith k-cile. We have
the following:
Denition 9 The population ranking data x is apparently overcondent if x strictly rst
order stochastically dominates
 
1
k
; :::; 1
k

:
If neither one of x and
 
1
k
; :::; 1
k

rst order stochastically dominates the other, then
the data has neither an unambiguously overcondent nor undercondent appearance. For
instance, the data
 
1
5
; 1
5
; 3
10
; 0; 3
10

contains a disproportionately large number of people who
consider themselves to be in the top fth, but a disproportionately small number who place
themselves in the top two fths.
Denition 10 The population ranking data x can be -rationalized if there exists a sig-
nalling model in which nature assigns a fraction 1
k
of the population to each k-cile and the
expected number of people whose updated beliefs will place their median type in the jth k-cile
is xj; j = 1; :::; k.19
The following theorem says that when people report the median of their beliefs, a rational
population can be twice as condentas reality would suggest, but no more. For instance,
suppose that people place themselves into deciles (k = 10). Then apparently overcondent
data in which 2
10
of the people rank themselves in the top decile, 4
10
rank themselves in the
18By denition, each person ranks himself striclty above the empty set, so that everyone is in a (unique)
k-cile.
19The denition assumes that nature places a fraction 1k of the population in each k-cile in order to avoid
trivialities. For instance, if the entire population were assigned a single type then, even without receiving
any signals, 100% of the population would place themselves in the 1st decile. Most of the experimental work
seems to carry a presumption that the population divides evenly into the k-ciles.
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top two deciles, and 2i
10
rank themselves in the top i deciles for i = 3; 4; 5 can be rationalized.
However, data in which 3
10
of the population place themselves in the top decile can not
be explained as rational. (Although we have been emphasizing overcondent looking data,
there is a similar constraint put on undercondent looking data, and that is captured by
the second inequality in the theorem.) Let dne denote the least integer weakly greater than
n 2 R:
Theorem 3 The population ranking data x can be -rationalized if and only if
kX
i
xj  2
k
(1 + k   i) , i =

k + 1
2

; :::; k and
iX
1
xj  2
k
i, i = 1; :::;

k   1
2

Moreover, the rationalizing can be done with a symmetric signalling model.
Corollary 1 Population ranking data in which the median declared placement is as high as
the 75th percentile, but no higher, can be -rationalized.
While almost everyone can rationally think they are better than the median, only half
can rationally think they are better than the 75th percentile.
Theorem 3 provides hope for detecting overcondence by the use of ranking question-
naires. It is worth looking at Svensons data in greater detail than that provided by his
population median data. Svenson questioned students in Sweden and the United States,
asking them both about their driving safety and driving skill. Swedish drivers placed them-
selves into deciles in the following proportions when asked about their safety:
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Reports (%) 0:0 5:7 0:0 14:3 2:9 11:4 14:3 28:6 17:1 5:7
We rst note that although the population ranking data has an overcondent feel to it,
the data is not, strictly speaking, apparently overcondent, since fewer than 10% of the
population ranks itself in the top 10%. More importantly, Theorem 3 implies that the data
can be -rationalized, so that it is not indicative of cognitive biases.20 Note, for instance,
that while 65:7% of the people rank themselves among the top 40%, Theorem 3 would allow
up to 80% to rationally do so. Furthermore, the median ranking is between the seventh and
eighth decile, which Corollary 1 permits of a rational population. In fact, out of Svensons
four questions, only half yield answers that cannot be -rationalized namely, the American
answers. The median safety placement for American students is between 81% and 90%,
20Theorem 4 below shows that the data can also be  rationalized.
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which violates Corollary 1. While the median skill placement is in the acceptable 61  70%
range, 46% of the population places itself in the top 20% of skill level, which is too many
to -rationalize. Thus, Svenson does nd some evidence of overcondence (if his subjects
based their answers on their median types), but it is not as strong as commonly believed.
Note that when 46% of the population place themselves in the top 20% this is only 6% too
many, not 26%.
Theorem 3 is our rst positive result: if people self-evaluate using their median rank-
ings, then questionnaires have the potential to detect overcondence. Unfortunately, our
next result indicates that if people use their mean rankings, then even the more complete
population ranking data is useless.21
Denition 11 The population ranking data x can be -rationalized if there exists a sig-
nalling model in which nature assigns a fraction 1
k
of the population to each k-cile and the
expected number of people whose updated beliefs will place their mean type in the jth k-cile is
xj; j = 1; :::; k.
Theorem 4 Any population ranking data can be -rationalized.
1.1.3 Reasonableness
The previous discussion has been in the rather abstract language of signalling models. Some
readers may wonder if the results depend upon signalling models that are somehow bizarre.
In this section, we address this concern.
One obvious reason for a person to consider herself a safe driver is that she has not had
any accidents. Thinking of driving as a test, and not having an accident as passing the
test, motivates the next denition.
Denition 12 A testing model consists of a population of individuals and a type space
[0; 1] such that:
i) Nature chooses a type  2 [0; 1] for each individual independently, resulting in some
distribution p; initially, each persons beliefs about his own type are described by p.
ii) A person of type  receives a signal passwith probability  and failwith probability
1  :
iii) Each person updates his beliefs about himself using Bayesrule.
21Theorem 4 is the rst result that relies on a signalling model that is not symmetric. This could be
considered to be a defect of the theorem, if there is a reason to believe that the trait under consideration
is symmetrically distributed in the population. As far as we know, no one in the literature has argued that
their data is signicant because the trait distriubtion is symmetric.
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A testing model is a natural and simple signalling model. In a symmetric testing model,
the prior distribution is symmetric.
Theorem 5 Population median data x, for any x 2 (0; 1), can be -rationalized, -rationalized,
and -rationalized by a symmetric testing model. Furthermore, data in which any fraction
x 2 (0; 1) of the population rank themselves strictly above any fraction q 2 (0; 1) of the
population can be -rationalized by a symmetric testing model.
Theorem 5 implies Theorems 1 and 2 of Section 1.1.1. As it depends only upon a
symmetric testing model, which is quite simple and straightforward, it shows that those
results do not depend upon a strained signalling model.
While the simplicity of a testing model is a virtue, it has a cost: since it involves only two
signals, pass and fail, it can only generate data in which the populations updated beliefs
divide into at most two sets. Thus, while population median data can be rationalized by
a testing model, population ranking data in which the population places itself into more
than two k-ciles (k > 2) cannot be. At the same time, a driver, for example, self-evaluates
using not only the number of accidents she has had, but also the number of near-accidents,
her beliefs about her reexes and eyesight, and myriad other factors, which may be better
captured by the abstractness of a signalling model than by a more concretely specied model.
What makes for a reasonable signalling model? A standard restriction found in the
literature is that a signalling structure (S;; f) should satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
property (mlrp): for all 0 > , f0 (s)
f(s)
is increasing in s. The following proposition shows that
the mlrp has implications for population ranking data.
Proposition 2 For " < 1
14
, the population ranking data
 
"; "; 1
2
  "; 1
2
  " cannot be  rationalized
by a signalling model with a signalling structure that satistes mlrp.
Proposition 2 stands in contrast to Theorem 3 of Section 1.1.2. This proposition leaves
open the possibility that population ranking data might be more useful than is implied by
that theorem. For instance, one might hope to argue that Svensons Swedish data is, in fact,
indicative of some overcondence, as it could not be rationalized by a reasonablesignalling
model. While this possibility is intriguing, the following example shows that imposing mlrp
still leaves plenty of room for overcondence.
Example 1 The data x =
 
1
6
; 1
6
; 1
3
; 1
3

can be  rationalized by a signalling model with a
signalling structure that satises mlrp. In particular, let the type space be  = f1; 2; 3; 4g, let
the set of signals be S = f1; 2; 3; 4g, and let the probability with which type  receives signal
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s be given by, for " < 7
180
, f (s):
f1 (s) =
8>>><>>>:
1
3
+ 4" s = 1
1
3
  2" s = 2
1
3
  3:5" s = 3
1:5" s = 4
; f2 (s) =
8>>><>>>:
1
3
  5" s = 1
1
3
s = 2
1
3
+ 3" s = 3
2" s = 4
f3 (s) =
8>>><>>>:
5
6
" s = 1
8
5
" s = 2
1
2
+ 1
2
" s = 3
1
2
  44
15
" s = 4
, f4 (s) =
8>>><>>>:
1
6
" s = 1
2
5
" s = 2
1
6
s = 3
5
6
  17
30
" s = 4
Finally, let the types be uniformly distributed. It is easily veried that the signalling structure
satises mlrp. Moreover the fraction of people who see the signal s = 1 is 1
6
and the median
of their posteriors is  = 1; the fraction of people who see the signal s = 2 is 1
6
and the
median of their posteriors is  = 2; the fraction of people who see the signal s = 3 is 1
3
and
the median of their posteriors is  = 3; the fraction of people who see the signal s = 4 is 1
3
and the median of their posteriors is  = 4.
As to  rationalizing, Theorem 5 shows that even a simple testing model permits any
fraction of the population to place their mean type in the top 1% of the population, so that
imposing mlrp has no hope of eliminating extremely overcondent looking data.
1.2 Scale Questions
In scale questionnaires, participants are asked to make evaluations using a scale. There are
variations, but in the version we consider people are asked to compare themselves to the
average person on a designated scale.22 For instance, Alicke et al. (1995) present subjects
with a personality trait, such as intelligence or dependability, and ask them to rate the
extent to which the trait describe(s) themselves relative to the average college student of the
same sex, on a single 9-point scale (0=much less than the average college student;4=about
the same as the average college student;8=much more than the average college student).
More generally, in a scale survey (of this type), a comparison scale T and average
m are specied, and each person i is asked to compare himself to this average by choosing an
xi 2 T . Population scale data is a quadruple (T;m; n; x) ; where T  R is the scale used
in the questionnaire, m 2 T is the specied scale average, n is the number of individuals,
22In a common variant each person places him or herself on a scale from 1 to T and indicates the fraction
of the population that falls into each scale position. This is formally equivalent for dening apparent
overcondence. However, the notions of rationalizing becomes relatively involved, as the di¤erent population
distributions must also be explained.
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and x = 1
n
Pn
i=1 xi, where each xi 2 T . The literature uses the notion that the population
scale data is apparently overcondent if x > m.
Before proceeding, we must note that the fundamental methodology in many scale ques-
tionnaires seems a bit dubious. The basic idea, apparently, is that in a rational population,
the answers given should average out. But given the subjective nature of many of these
scales, it is unclear why this should be so, even when there is no uncertainty at all and
everyone is in perfect agreement. Imagine the following question posed to two drummers, A
and B, in a room:
On an integer scale from  5 (much worse), 0 (the same) to 5 (much better),
please rate yourself as a drummer compared to the other drummer.
Suppose that, as it happens, both A and B are of the opinion that the only skill that
matters in a drummer is accurate time keeping. Furthermore, they both agree that As time
keeping is 80% accurate, while Bs is 30% accurate. There seems to be little scope for true
overcondence (or undercondence). There also seems to be nothing wrong with A rating
himself with a 4, and B rating herself with a  2. After all, the scale markings are subjective.
Nonetheless, the standard measure indicates overcondence since the average rating is 1, not
0.23
Despite our reservations, we will proceed as if the scales are interpreted in a consistent
manner by all concerned. Alternatively, we will only be considering scale questionnaires in
which there is an objective scale. As an example, Weinstein (1980) asks students how their
chances of obtaining a good job o¤er before graduation compare to those of other students
at their college, with choices ranging from 100% less than average to 5 times the average.
Here there is no ambiguity in the meaning of the scale, but two ambiguities remain; namely,
what is meant by an average student,24 and what a subject means by a point estimate of his
or her own type?
As we saw, in ranking questionnaires the median is the only notion of an average student
that it is reasonable for us to consider.25 It turns out that in scale questionnaires, only the
mean provides us with a useful notion of an average student, although it is reasonable for
respondents to use either the mean of the median.
23There are still other potential problems with scale questions. For instance, Schwarz et al. (1991) ask
subjects how successful they have been in life, and nd that answers di¤er signicantly depending upon
whether subjects are presented with a scale from  5 to 5, or 0 to 10.
24Weinstein asks subjects to compare themselves to other Cook studentsusing terms such as 50% less
than average. Alicke et al. ask their subjects to compare themselves to the average student.
25More precisely, if the trait described is not symmetrically distributed, there is no reason for 50% of the
people to be ranked above the mean. If the trait is symmetrically distributed, then the mean equals the
median anyway.
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To illustrate, suppose for the sake of discussion that all of Weinsteins subjects agree that
there are two types of students at their college, low and high, with job o¤er probabilities
pL = 0:3 and pH = 1, and that 80% of the population are low type. A reasonable interpre-
tation of an average student is one whose chance of obtaining an o¤er is 0:3. Consider a
respondent who thinks that there is a 50% chance that she is a low type. Her probability of
obtaining a good job o¤er is (:5 0:3) + (:5 1) = 0:65. A perfectly reasonable response to
Weinsteins question is that her chances are 35% above average. Note that we are claiming
that a reasonable, perhaps the most reasonable, way to answer uses the median (or mode)
in determining the population average, but the mean (of her own beliefs) for self-evaluating.
It is not necessary that the reader accept this as the most reasonable way of answering, but
merely that he or she accepts this as a plausible way. Of course, this is not to deny that it is
also reasonable for a respondent to use the population mean in dening the average student
and her own mean for self-evaluating. Moreover, for other questions, in particular those not
involving probabilities, it may be reasonable for subjects to use their median type, rather
than mean type, when self-evaluating. Thus, just considering medians and means, there are
four ways to interpret answers to scale questions.
We will spare the reader the formalization of all four treatments. It is fairly obvious
that in the two cases where people self-evaluate using the median of their beliefs, apparent
overcondence will not imply overcondence, since there is no particular reason for the
weighted average of medians to equal the population median or mean. Example 2 below
shows that apparent overcondence also does not imply overcondence when people self-
evaluate using their mean belief, and the population average is taken to be the median.
Theorem 6 below covers the fourth case.
Example 2 Consider an experiment in which 150 subjects are asked to compare themselves
to others on a scale T = f0; 1; :::; 9; 10g, where 5 is average, 0 indicates much below
average, and 10 indicates much above average. Suppose that the number of people who
place themselves at 5 is 50, and that for each of 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 the number is 20. Clearly,
the data is apparently overcondent, since nobody places himself below the average, and 2/3
of the people place themselves strictly above. We now show how to rationally explain this
data when the average 5 represents the median type, and respondents self-evaluate using their
mean type.
Suppose that, in fact, of the 150 subjects, 90 are 5s and 60 are 10s. Note that the median
type is 5. This general information is common knowledge. Beyond this, each person receives
a signal giving him further information about his own type. The set of signals is S =
f0; 1; :::; 9; 10g and, for the two types in the population, the probability of receiving a signal
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are given by:
f5 (s) =
8><>:
0 s < 5
5
9
s = 5
20 2s
45
s > 5
and f10 (s) =
(
0 s  5
s 5
15
s > 5
Some simple calculations show that the expected number of people who will receive the signal 5
is 50, and that any one receiving this signal knows that his type is 5. For each i = 6; :::10, the
expected number who will receive the signal is 20, and, using Bayesrule, a person receiving
the signal i has a mean type of i. Therefore, we expect 50 people to rationally rate themselves
as 5s, and 20 people to rationally rate themselves each of 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, as reported in
the experiment.
The next theorem contrasts markedly with this example. It shows that if average stu-
dentis interpreted as the mean of the population, and people self-evaluate using the mean of
their beliefs, then apparent overcondence implies overcondence. More precisely, consider a
(large) population whose mean type is m, and whose members know the overall distribution
of types and learn about themselves over time. Then, if individuals report their mean type,
at any point in time, the expected average report must be m:
Theorem 6 Consider a population where individual i = 1; :::; n is of type ti 2 T  R, and m
is the mean type. Suppose that each person knows the distribution of types in the population
and receives a signal about his own type. Then E
 
1
n
Pn
i=1
ti

= m, where ti is the mean of
person is updated beliefs.
Theorem 6 provides the rst case where the standard interpretation of the data found in
the literature has merit. Weinstein nds that his subjects display apparent overcondence.
If we assume that his subjects consider the average subject to be represented by the mean
of the population, and that they self-evaluate using their mean type, then his subjects also
display overcondence. Since Weinstein asks his subjects for probability information, it does
seem most reasonable to interpret their responses as reecting their mean self-evaluations.
On the other hand, as we argued earlier, it may be more reasonable for subjects to consider
the average of the population to be the median individual, rather than the mean.
1.3 Small Samples
As we discussed in Section 1.1.1, our denitions of rationalizing, which rely on expected
data, can be understood as implicitly insisting that the data be generatable by innitely
large populations. Naturally, an experimenter prefers to have as large a subject pool as
possible, so that her results cannot be dismissed as a statistical aberration (or experimental
error). Thus, our implicit assumption that the data comes from an innitely large population
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provides the best case for the data. Nonetheless, actual experimental populations are, of
course, nite, and many experiments involve quite small numbers. It is worth noting that
nite samples permit data that is even more (seemingly) anomalous.
Consider the following quote from Camerer (1997):
The now-standard approach to games of imperfect information pioneered by
John Harsanyi presumes that players begin with a common priorprobability
distribution over any chance outcomes. As an example, consider two rms A
and B, who are debating whether to enter a new industry like Internet software.
Suppose it is common knowledge that only one rm will survive-the rm with
more skilled managers, say- so rms judge the chance that their managers are
the more skilled. The common prior assumption insists both rms cannot think
they are each more likely to have the most skill.
Despite the apparent plausibility of this statement, we now show that, using the standard
approach,each of two rms can, in fact, concurrently hold the belief that it is more likely to
be the more skillful. Furthermore, this state of a¤airs can arise with probability arbitrarily
close to one. The following is a simple and straightforward model yielding this result.
1. Nature moves rst. With probability 1
2
, Firm 1 has high skill, Firm 2 has low skill;
with probability 1
2
Firm 1 has low skill, Firm 2 has high skill. Both rms know this,
but neither is told Natures choice.
2. Each rm takes a test. The high skill rm passes with probability ph, the low skill rm
passes with probability pl, where ph > pl.
3. Each rm uses Bayesrule to determine the probability that it is the more skillful.
As an illustration, if ph = 0:99 and pl = 0:98, then, from Bayesrule, a rm that passes
the test believes there is a 0:502 chance that is the more skillful. Moreover, with probability
0:97 both rms will pass the test. Thus, with probability 0:97 each rm will believe that it
is more likely to be the more skillful. If ph = 1 and pl = 0:5, then with probability 12 both
rms will pass the test, and each will then simultaneously believe it has a 2
3
chance of being
the more skillful. The following proposition generalizes these possibilities.
Proposition 3 For any p 2 (0; 1), the parameters in the above model can be chosen so that
with probability p each rm will believe there is strictly more than a 1
2
chance that it is the
more skillful. In particular, the parameters can be chosen so that with a 50% chance each
rm will believe there is a 2
3
chance that it is the more skillful; in order for the chance to be
more than 50%, the belief must be smaller than 2
3
, in order for the belief to be greater than
2
3
, the chance must be less than 50%:
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Proof of Proposition 3. The probability that a rm that passes the test is high skill
is:
p ( = H j pass) =
1
2
ph
1
2
ph +
1
2
pl
>
1
2
The probability that both rms past the test is phpl. Fixing p  pl < pp (to ensure that
1  ph > pl), and setting ph = ppl establishes the rst part.
To establish the second part, note that the solution to the problem
max
pl;ph
1
2
ph
1
2
ph +
1
2
pl
subject to phpl  12 and ph > pl; is 23 at ph = 1; pl = 12 .
We note that the rst part of the proposition has nothing to do with there being two
rms an arbitrary nite number of rms can all believe they are the best rm with any
probability p 2 (0; 1).
2 Actions
We have emphasized the ambiguity inherent in the interpretation of replies to questionnaires.
A di¤erent approach to the study of overcondence circumvents this ambiguity by asking
subjects to take actions. The subjectsbeliefs are then inferred from their actions. In this
section we look at two such studies.
2.1 Entry
In an oft-cited paper, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) test for overcondence using an experiment
meant to model rmsentry decisions. N subjects (rms) must decide whether to play
In or Out. After the entry decisions are made, the subjects who have played In are ranked.
The payo¤ to playing In is greater than the payo¤ to playing Out if and only if an entrant
is ranked in the top k < N (hence, all subjects who play In do better than all subjects who
play Out if fewer than k choose In). There are two treatments.
1. Treatment 1. The subjects who play In are ranked randomly.
2. Treatment 2. The subjects who play In are ranked according to their results on a skill
or trivia test. (The test is administered after the entry decisions, but subjects are given
sample questions beforehand).
Since the number of subjects that can protably play In is independent of the treatment,
the authors test for overcondence on the part of subjects by testing if the number of
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entrants is greater under Treatment 2 than under Treatment 1.26 They nd that, indeed,
more subjects enter under the second treatment than the rst. But is this an indication of
overcondence, with its implication of irrationality, or apparent overcondence, with no such
implication?27
We now show that if more subjects enter under Treatment 2 than Treatment 1, this only
shows apparent overcondence.
We proceed with a slightly simpler setup than the one used by Camerer and Lovallo;
the basic methodology and conclusions remain valid for their more intricate setup. Suppose
there are two subjects (N = 2), and that only one of them can protably play In (k = 1).
Specically, if both subjects enter, the higher ranked one earns 1, the lower ranked one loses
3. A subject who enters alone, again earns 1. A subject who does not enter earns 0. We can
write the subjective expected payo¤matrixfor the game as follows, where pi is subject is
belief that he or she will be the higher ranked:
In Out
In p1   3 (1  p1) ; p2   3 (1  p2) 1; 0
Out 0; 1 0; 0
Since there are only two participants, the two treatments in this case are:
1. Under Treatment 1, if both subjects enter, the higher ranked subject is randomly
chosen with probability 1
2
.
2. Under Treatment 2, if both subjects enter, their ranking is determined by a trivia test.
The test is administered only after entry decisions have been made, but each subject
is shown a sample question before.
To explain Camerer and Lovallos nding of more entry under Treatment 2 than Treat-
ment 1 as the result of apparent overcondence, rather than overcondence, we must specify
a signalling model (preferably, a reasonableone); Section 1.3 provides one. Suppose that,
before seeing the sample question, each subject believes there is a 1
2
chance that he will do
better on the test, and (correctly) believes that if he is to do better (resp., worse) on the
test, he will know the answer to the sample question with probability ph (resp, pl, pl < ph).
26As they write The di¤erence in the number of entrants in the random and skill conditions is the primary
measure of interest.
27In fact, as a test of any kind of overcondence, the results of the paper are muddied by several com-
plicating issues, including the risk attitudes of the participants and their ability to play to an equilibrium.
We consider the best case scenario (for their paper) in which participants are risk-neutral and play to an
equilibrium.
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Suppose also that phpl > 12 , so that there is a greater than 50% chance that both subjects
will correctly answer the test (and each will think he is likely to be the more skillful).
We nd symmetric equilibria of the games induced by the two treatments:
1. Under the rst treatment, each subject enters with probability 1
2
. The expected number
of subjects that enters is 1.
2. Under the second treatment, each subject adopts the following strategy: If I answer the
the sample question correctly, I enter with probability ph+pl
4phpl
> 1
2
, if I answer incorrectly,
I do not enter. The expected number of rms that enter is 1
4phpl
(ph + pl)
2.
Note that 1
4phpl
(ph + pl)
2 > 1. Therefore, an experimenter should expect to nd that more
subjects enter under Treatment 2 than under Treatment 1, but this is only an indication of
apparent overcondence, not overcondence.28 Interestingly, this increased entry occurs even
though a subject that answers the sample question correctly realizes that there is a good
chance that the other subject will also consider himself to probably be the more skilled.
2.2 A Vocabulary Test
Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) divide subjects into groups and present them with two options:
1. Option 1. You will be given a monetary prize M with probability 1
2
, as determined by
the toss of a die.
2. Option 2. Everyone in your group will be administered a vocabulary test. You will be
given M if your score places you in the top half of your group.
Hoelzl and Rustichini write, Since only half of the subjects will win if the test decides
the winner, any excess over a half of the subjects voting for the test indicates an erroneous
evaluation of their own relative skills. This statement, which forms the basis of their
analysis, is incorrect.
To see why the statement is incorrect, rst note that a subject will prefer the test con-
dition if she thinks that there is more than a 50% chance that her performance will be in
the top half. If we assume, as Hoelzl and Rustichini do, that each person believes that
test taking ability can be summarized by a single parameter, or type, then a person will
28A di¤erent test is on the expected prots that subjects make, rather than the number of rms. If subjects
are (truly) overcondent under Treatment 2, rather than ostensibly overcondent, they will make negative
expected prots (see Section 5). However, Camerer and Lovallo do not nd that subjects make negative
prots (in the setting that does not su¤er from a self-selection problem, which is a separate issue that the
authors identify)
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prefer the test if the median of her beliefs about herself is better than the group median. If
more than 50% of the people (strictly) prefer the test, then the population displays apparent
overcondence; this apparent overcondence indicates an erroneous evaluationonly if the
data cannot be -rationalized (given that people are using their median types). However, as
Theorem 1 indicates, any amount of apparent overcondence can be -rationalized.29 Thus,
there is no error in judgement implied when more than half the subjects vote for the test.
In fact, even without the formalization in this paper, it is rather trivial to see that there
is nothing wrong with more than half the subjects voting for the test. Imagine, for the sake
of argument, 10 subjects who reach the following conclusion in the waiting room: Nine of
them are native English speakers, with a perfectly ordinary command of the language, while
one is a Haitian with a more recent knowledge of English. There is certainly nothing wrong
with the nine native speakers voting for an English vocabulary test on the grounds that this
gives each of them a 5
9
> 1
2
chance of winning the prize. Thus, the experimental design of
Hoelzl and Rustichini cannot possibly prove what they set out to prove.
The authors actually run two treatments of their experiment, one in which the vocabulary
test is easy, one in which it is di¢ cult. In both cases, subjects vote on the options before
the test is administered, but are shown sample questions (either easy or di¢ cult) before
the vote. Hoelzl and Rustichini nd that more subjects vote for the test option when the
test is easy, than when it is di¢ cult (64% vote for the test when it is easy, 39% vote for
the test when it is di¢ cult). They write Two interpretations of this result are possible.
The rst interpretation is that subjects confuse being goodwith being better... A second
interpretation is possible in terms of ambiguity aversion. In fact, a third interpretation is
possible within a completely rational framework. In Section 4.2 we show that one should
expect apparent overcondence when the test is easy and apparent undercondence when
the test is di¢ cult.30 To understand this result in the present context, imagine that the
di¢ cult (on average) test is a Haitian Creole vocabulary test. Now we should expect nine
of the subjects to vote against the test, on the grounds that it would give each of them a
4
9
< 1
2
chance of winning.
29More precisely, Theorem 1 says that any degree of apparent overcondence short of 100% can be -
rationalized. Given that any experiment must allow a margin for error, one could argue that even 100%
apparent overcondence is not problematic. Moreover, -rationalization is (implicitly) for an innite popu-
lation; for a nite rational population 100% ostensible overcondence can be obtained without experimental
error.
30In fact, Propostion 3 can also be turned on its head to the same e¤ect.
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3 Testing for (true) Overcondence
While the experiment run by Hoelzl and Rustichini does not provide a proper test of over-
condence, we now provide two modications that do provide a proper test. The validity of
both experiments derives from Theorem 7 below, which generalizes the necessary conditions
of Theorem 3.
First Experiment
Suppose subjects are given the following two options:
1. Option 1. You will be given a monetary prize M with probability 1
2
, determined by
the toss of a die.
2. Option 2. Everyone in your group will be administered a vocabulary test. You will be
given M if your score places you in the top x% of your group.
A subject prefers the test condition if she thinks that there is more than a 50% chance
that she will perform in the top x% of her group. That is, a person will prefer the test if her
median type is in the top x%. From Theorem 7, at most 2x% of the people can rationally
hold such a belief (at least if the population is large), so that a choice of x smaller than 50
by the experimenter provides a viable test. For instance if x = 30 so that a subject wins if
he or she places in the top 30%, then at most 60% can rationally vote for the test.31
Second Experiment
Suppose that 10 subjects are given the option between winning M with probability 6
10
,
and winningM if they place among the top 5 in a vocabulary test. As the following theorem
indicates, at most 8 of the subjects can rationally prefer the test.
Theorem 7 A fraction y or greater of a population can rationally believe that there is at
least a probability q that their types are strictly better than the worst type in the top x% of
the population if and only if qy  x:
4 Apparent Overcondence?
Recent work has questioned the universality of overcondence. In particular, there is evidence
that when the skill under consideration is objectively measurable, populations do not display
much apparent overcondence, and that they even display apparent undercondence when
the skill is a di¢ cult one to master. In this section, we explain these facts within our rational
framework.
31We gratuitously (since we have not run an experiment) remark that we doubt that more than 60% would
vote for the test.
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4.1 Objectivity
Moore (2007) writes Attributes that are specic, public, and objectively measurable tend to
show the weakest BTA [better-than-average] e¤ects, whereas vague, private and subjective
attributes tend to show the strongest BTA e¤ects. It is reasonable to presume that people
have more information and, hence, tighter estimates of their own abilities for attributes that
are more objectively measurable. The following proposition indicates that when people are
quite certain of their types, there cannot be much apparent overcondence (or undercon-
dence).
For simplicity, suppose the type space  is nite. For any two probability distributions
p and q on , let the distance between them be
d (p; q) = max
j
jpj   qjj :
We say that a distribution q is  close to a degenerate if there exists a j  jj such that
for ej (the jth canonical vector) d (q; ej)  :
Proposition 4 Consider a signalling model in which the proportion of individuals strictly
above the median of the population distribution is . For all " there is a  and a t such that,
if the expected fraction of the population who have beliefs (after receiving their signals) that
are -close to a degenerate is at least t, then jxm   j < " and jx   j < ", where xm (x) is
the expected population median data when people self-evaluate using their median type (mean
type).
This proposition is a continuousanalogue of Proposition 1, which shows that population
median data cannot be apparently overcondent when peoples beliefs about themselves are
degenerate.
4.2 Condence and Di¢ culty
Kruger (1999) nds a below-average e¤ect in domains in which absolute skills tend to be
low. Moore (2007), summarizing similar work, writes When the task is di¢ cult or success
is rare, people believe that they are below average. Standard explanations for the condence
discrepancy between easy and di¢ cult skills focus on cognitive errors, such as a tendency
for people to focus egocentrically on their own skills and insu¢ ciently take into account
the skills of the comparison group (Kruger (1999)). In this section, we o¤er a rational
explanation (of course).
Imagine a large pool of subjects who are informed that the level of g-ability in the
population varies uniformly from 0 to 1. Since none of them has ever heard of g-ability, each
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one (rationally) considers that his or her g-ability is equally likely to be anywhere from 0 to
1. Now suppose that they are given a test which measures g-ability. They are told that the
test is an easy one: a person with ability t will pass with probability 0:7 + 0:2t.
What will a person who passes the test conclude about his ability? He certainly will
not be surprised that he passed, since he expected to pass the test regardless of his ability.
Nonetheless, his condence in his g-ability will increase, if only slightly. More precisely,
using Bayesrule, he will ascribe probability 0:7+0:2t
:8
= 0:25t + 0:875 to being of type t. His
median type will be :53 and his mean type will be :52,32 both better than the median (or
mean) of the population. Thus, whether he ranks himself by his median type or mean type,
he will consider himself to be better than average. Furthermore, his beliefs about himself
will strictly rst order stochastically dominate the prior. But, (about) 80% of population
will pass the test, and so the population will exhibit apparent overcondence. While the
population is apparently overcondent, it is not overcondent.
Now let us change just one thing: The test is a di¢ cult one, and everyone is so informed.33
Specically, the probability of passing the test is now 0:1+0:2t, so that 80% of the people are
expected to fail. Using Bayesrule, those who fail will have a median type of 0:47, and mean
type of 0:48, and the population distribution will strictly rst order stochastically dominate
their beliefs. Thus a population facing a di¢ cult test will exhibit apparent undercondence.
Theorem 8 below formalizes the above argument using a testing model (dened in Section
1.1.3). Let p be the prior that nature uses in the testing model and P be the associated
cumulative distribution function. Then E () =
R
dP is the average number of people who
pass the test, and this number is naturally interpreted as the di¢ culty of the test. We say
that a test is easy if E () < 1
2
and di¢ cult if E () > 1
2
. Let m be the median type.
Theorem 8 Suppose that beliefs are generated by a symmetric testing model with a non-
degenerate prior distribution p. Following the test, on average a fraction E () will consider
that their mean type is strictly better than the population median and will have beliefs about
themselves that strictly f.o.s.d the population distribution; a fraction 1  E () will consider
that their mean type is strictly worse than the population median and will have beliefs about
themselves that are strictly f.o.s.d by the population distribution. Furthermore, the fraction
E () will consider that their median type is weakly better than the population median. If p
has a density, or p (m) is small enough, the fraction E () (1 E ()) will consider that their
median type is strictly better (worse) than the population median. Thus, if the test is easy
the population will exhibit apparent overcondence, while if it is di¢ cult, the population will
32The median is the solution to
R t
0
(0:25t+ 0:875) dt = 12 , while the mean is given by
R 1
0
(0:25t+ 0:875) tdt:
33The crucial di¤erence between our discussion here and the reasoning of Healy and Moore (2007), is that
here everybody knows precisely the di¢ culty of the test they are taking. See Section 7 for a discusion of
Healy and Moore (2007).
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exhibit apparent undercondence.
Thus, when a task is di¢ cult or success is rarewe can expect apparent undercondence,
and when a task is easy, we can expect apparent overcondence.
5 Does it Matter?
In Section 2.1, we saw that apparently overcondent entrepreneurs might enter an industry
at a greater rate than entrepreneurs with neutral beliefs about their abilities. The same,
of course, is true about (truly) overcondent entrepreneurs. This invites the question: does
it really matter if a population is apparently overcondent but not overcondent, or is
the distinction merely semantic minutia? In this section, we argue that the distinction is
important.
Recall that in the two player game analyzed in Section 2.1, under the random ranking
treatment the equilibrium expected number of rms is 1 while under the test treatment 
which leads to apparent overcondence the equilibrium expected number of rms is greater
than 1. Crucially, however, the expected prots of each rm is zero under both treatments
(as is easily veried). In contrast, consider what happens when rms are truly overcondent.
For instance, suppose each rm irrationally believes there is a 3
4
chance that it is the more
skillful. Given these beliefs, entering is a dominant strategy for each rm, and in equilibrium
each rm earns  1. Thus, while the presence of overcondence requires us to rethink the
basic economic tenet that rms will not enter an industry if there are negative prots to be
made, the presence of apparent overcondence does not.
Some authors use overcondence as a springboard for assuming that agents have an irra-
tional bias. For instance, in an inuential nance paper, Malmendier and Tate (2005) write
Our overcondence story builds upon a prominent stylized fact from the social psychology
literature, the better-than-averagee¤ect. When individuals assess their relative skill, they
tend to overstate their acumen relative to the average. Armed with this supposed evi-
dence of irrationality, Malmendier and Tate go on to assume that the CEOs in their model
overestimate the returns to their projects. However, if, as we have argued, the evidence is
only that people are apparently overcondent, then the evidence is consistent with agents
using all the information available to them in the best possible way, in which case it supplies
no justication for assuming that agents make biased estimates. In particular, apparently
overcondent CEOs who are not overcondent will, on average, have a correct estimate of
the returns to their projects.
Should authorities regulate the behaviour of drivers by imposing speed limits, mandating
seat belt use, etc..., rather than simply informing them of the risks? One argument in
favour of such regulation would be that drivers have too much condence in their abilities.
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As Svenson writes, Why should we pay much attention to information directed towards
drivers in general if [we believe] we are safer and more skillful than they are?But if drivers
are only apparently overcondent, they may well pay attention. Note that in the driving
example from the introduction, the 3
5
of the population who rate themselves above average
still believe that with a probability of 4
9
they are no more skilled than average, so there is
certainly no reason for them to simply ignore advice pitched at the general population.
6 Evidence on Our Approach
The basic principle driving our results is that people who receive good signals will tend to
be condent, while those who receive bad signals will tend to be uncondent, regardless
of the underlying probabilities of receiving the signals. Thus, the previously noted nding
that people tend to be apparently undercondent on di¢ cult tasks (where they fail relatively
often) and apparently overcondent on easy tasks lends support to our approach. In a similar
vein, recall that Hoelzl and Rustichini show people di¢ cult sample vocablulary questions
(which are likely to send a person the bad signal that he could not answer the question) and
easy sample questions (which are likely to send a good signal). A sample question is only
one signal among a lifetime of signals, so that it is unclear how a person should rank himself
given this piece of information. Nonetheless, ceteris paribus, a positive signal should induce
a higher ranking than a negative signal, and Hoelzl and Rustichini do nd that people rank
themselves higher following an easy sample question than a di¢ cult one.
An accident is, presumably, a negative signal about a drivers ability. Preston and Harris
(1965) ask drivers who have recently had accidents to rate themselves on a scale from 0 to
9. The mean of their self-ratings turns out to be almost identicalto the mean self-rating
of a control group that has not had any accidents (the actual data is not reported). This
nding tends to go against our reasoning. However, it should be noted that the accident
drivers were interviewed while still in the hospital, and many faced severe legal and nancial
consequences as a result of the accidents, so there is considerable reason to view their answers
with skepticism. Indeed, only 15 drivers admitted responsibility for their accidents, while
police reports blamed 34; given the circumstances, these 19 denials can hardly be deemed
irrational or surprising. While Preston and Harrisevidence may be dubious, Marotolli and
Richardson (1998) nd similar results in a more neutral setting. They interview drivers (not
selected for accident histories) in their homes, and still nd no di¤erence in the condence
levels of drivers who have had adverse driving events (according to their own reports) and the
condence levels of those who have not. Specically, 68% of both groups rate themselves as
being better than the average driver, and none rate themselves as being below average. On
the other hand, in our favour Groenger and Grande (1996) nd that driversself assessments
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are positively correlated to the average number of accident-free miles they have driven.
Importantly, they also nd that these self-assessments are uncorrelated to the number of
accidents the drivers have had. The number of accident-free miles would seem to be the
more relevant statistic, so Groenger and Grandes nding may help explain Marotolli and
Richardsons negative result.34
We interpreted Proposition 4 of Section 4.1 as showing that populations should display
less apparent overcondence or undercondence with reference to objectively dened traits,
as researchers have found to be the case. Technically, the proposition says that popula-
tions in which people have tight estimates of their own skill levels should not display much
overcondence or undercondence. Bayesian updaters have tighter estimates of their own
skill as they gather more information. This suggests that we should expect drivers with
more experience to display less apparent overcondence. In line with this prediction, Wal-
ton (1999) interviews professional truck drivers, who have considerable driving experience
(each one drives approximately 100; 000 kilometers per year), and nds no bias in their self-
assessments of their relative skills. Walton does nd a majority of the truckers claiming to
be safer than average.35 However, it is quite possible that most of the truck drivers had
not had an accident, and had only had safe drving experiences, so that a majority should
rank themselves as safer than average.36 Mathews and Moran (1986) question young drivers
(18-25) and older drivers (35-50). They nd that while the young drivers rate themselves as
being better overall drivers than their peers, the older drivers rank themselves comparably
to drivers in their age group. Similarly, Holland (1993) nds no self-bias for drivers in their
fties, or for drivers in their seventies either.37 On the other hand, Marotolli and Richardson
(1998) nd a pronounced better than average e¤ect in a sample of drivers 72 years and older,
as does Cooper (1990) in a sample aged at least 55 years.
Thus, we nd existing evidence in favour of our approach, although not all the evidence is
in our favour.38 We note that it would be wrong-headed to attempt a direct test of our model
by, say, trying to determine whether or not people actually know the distribution of types in
the population. That is at once only a simplifying assumption and one that makes it harder
34To push the point further, one might expect better drivers to drive more, raising their number of
accidents, so that the number of accidents itself would be a poor indicator of ability.
35Walton (1999) asks the drivers many questions, but skill and safety are the only ranking questions.
36That is, the notion that experience should dissipate apparent overcondence is too coarse. In the short
run, this need not be the case.
37Holland does nd that drivers in their seventies consider themselves less prone to non-driving mishaps
(e.g., losing an important document) than average. However, Holland speculates that in this regard the
drivers may be comparing themselves to all seventy year olds, not just the driving subpopulation, so that
there is no apparent problem.
38In line with the rest of our paper, we accept the evidence without examining the quality of the work
(with the exception of the Preston and Harris paper).
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to rationalize the data we could easily relax the denition of a signalling model to one in
which nature rst picks one of several distributions, and people then receive signals about
their own types and the population distribution, without altering our basic conclusions.
7 Literature
There is a vast literature on overcondence, both testing for it and providing explanations
for it. We have already mentioned some of the evidentiary literature. On the explanatory
side, most of the literature accepts that there is something wrong when a majority of people
believe they are above average, and either explains the phenomenon as resulting from a
psychological error, or nds a rational way around the data.
The rst category of explanations include egocentrism (Kruger (1999)), incompetence
(Kruger and Dunning (1999)) and self-serving biases (Greenwald (1980)). Bénabou and
Tirole (2002) introduce a behavioral bias that causes people to become overcondent.
In the second category of explanations, Dunning et al. (1989) nd that people may have
varying notions of what, say, constitutes a good driver. If people are interpreting the question
di¤erently, there is not even an apparent contradiction when most people report themselves
to be better than average (although there may be a self-seving bias in their interpretations).
Van den Steen (2004) and Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) push this further and propose
that as a result of these variances, people invest in skills in di¤erent ways. In the model of
Santos-Pinto and Sobel, Without the ability to add to skills... precisely p percent of the
population would claim to be better than 1   p percent of the others.However, we have
shown that there is no need for there to be this perfect calibration, even if everyone agrees
on the evaluative criteria of skill and has no opportunity to invest in skills, provided only
that people do not know their own skills exactly.
In Healy and Moore (2007), people take a test that may be either di¢ cult or easy.39 Each
person is uncertain about his own ability, and about the di¢ culty of the test he is taking.
A person who takes the easy test and does well, is uncertain if this is because he is of high
ability or because the test is easy; hence he rationally assigns weight to both possibilities
and considers himself to be above average. Since most people who take the easy test do well,
those who take the easy test appear to be overcondent. By the same token, those who take
the di¢ cult test appear to be undercondent. More precisely, following the logic of Healy
and Moore, averaging over the entire population of test takers (those who take the easy and
the di¢ cult test), one should nd no apparent overcondence or undercondence,40 but the
39Healy and Moore (2007) have several purposes to their paper. To compare their work to ours, we focus
on the extent to which their theory can provide a completely rational explanation of the overcondence data.
However, that is not their primary focus. We encourage the reader to consult their paper.
40One could nd apparent overcondence if the subjects underestimate the fraction of tests that are
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analyst makes a mistake by focussing on the groups separately. Again following their logic,
if subjects understand the di¢ culty of their tasks, then their respective populations, even
viewed in isolation, should not rate themselves above or below average. However, we have
shown that there may be apparent overcondence and undercondence even in subjects who
understand their environments perfectly. As noted in Section 2.2, Hoelzl and Rustichini
nd apparent overcondence when their subjects are given an easy test and undercondence
when they are given a di¢ cult test. In their experiment subjects are told which test they are
taking (and it is obvious), so that Healy and Moores analysis does not apply.41 Similarly,
Krugers (1999) subjects consider easy tasks (e.g., riding a bicycle) and di¢ cult tasks (e.g.,
juggling) that are clearly delineated. Nonetheless, there are doubtless areas where it is hard
to judge di¢ culty and, even though that additional assumption is not necessary to generate
apparent overcondence, it may yield greater overcondence.
While the above literature tries to explain how anomalous data can arise, we show that
the data is, in fact, not anomalous at all. In this regard, Zábojnik (2004) is more in the
spirit of our paper, although his approach is very di¤erent. In his model, agents can choose
to forego consumption in order to learn about their abilities, which may be either high or
low. Given certain technical assumptions  in particular U (at), an individuals utility as
a function of his ability, is strictly convex, and EU (at) =U (at) is decreasing the optimal
learning rule of agents leads them to halt their learning in a biased fashion. As a result,
a disproportionate number end up ranking themselves as high in ability, despite the fact
that they are all rational Bayesians. Hence, like us, Zábojnik nds that the mere fact that
a disproportionate number of people rank themselves in the top x% does not indicate a
problem. However, as Zábojnik readily admits, he is not really concerned with explaining
much of the experimental evidence, where his experimentation story is not very compelling.
Furthermore, he requires technical assumptions which play no role in our work. For instance,
we show that apparent overcondence can rationally arise whether or not an agents utility is
convex. Beyond this, Zábojnik does not consider the possibility that people use their median
types to self-evaluate, and has a model with only two types of agents and two signals.
In a tangentially related paper, Ledyard (1986) argues that Bayesian rationality imposes
almost no restrictions on an agents behaviour. Specically, only the use of a dominated
strategy can be ruled out. Our paper di¤ers in many respects. First of all, at a purely
technical level, the two sets of results are unrelated. Second of all, we do obtain important
easy. However, as previously noted, we are interested in the extent to which Healy and Moore provide an
explanation that does not rely on errors.
41More precisely, the analysis of Healy and Moore does not apply if subjects know which test is easy
and have a good idea of just how easy and di¢ cult the tests are. There is evidence that the subjects did
understand the degree of di¢ culty: Hoezl and Rustichini ask them to guess the mean scores of the tests and,
for the tests they actually take, their estimates are remarkably close to the actual results.
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restrictions, as shown by Theorems 3, 6, and 7, so that the underlying messages of Ledyards
paper and ours are quite di¤erent. Finally, as Section 1.1.3 makes clear, our results do not
depend upon pushing the Bayesian assumption to its limits.
8 Conclusion
Consider two populations. In population A, about 50% of the people declare themselves
to be better than the median. In population B, about 80% of the people make the same
declaration. On the face of it, population A has good self knowledge, while population B
is somewhat delusional. Nevertheless, we have shown that unless agents have a very good
idea of their own skills, the declaration of population B is no more aberrational than the
declaration of population A. Put di¤erently, there is no more reason to try and justify
Bs data than As; both sets of data can naturally arise as the result of agents receiving
information about their skills.
Is there a tendency for people to be overcondent? We do not know, and have no stake
in the answer one way or the other. Psychologists do have theories independent of the
better-than-averageevidence we have cited for believing in overcondence. However, it is
imperative to have a clear statement of the problem (which we hope to have provided), and
to conduct proper empirical tests (such as the ones suggested in Section 3). As it stands,
much of the supposed evidence for overcondence shows nothing of the sort, even if the
evidence is taken completely on its own terms.
At the most abstract level, our reasoning makes it no more likely that a population
will rate itself above average than below average. Thus, if populations consistently rate
themselves as being better than average, a puzzle remains. However, recent evidence has
shown that the supposed universality of overcondence has been overstated. In particular,
populations appear to be undercondent with respect to di¢ cult skills, and there is little
apparent overcondence, or undercondence, when the skill is objectively dened. Our
theory predicts these di¤erences. Moreover, even if it were to turn out that the relative
number of studies pointing to overcondence rather than undercondence cannot be fully
accounted for by an easy/di¢ cult skill distinction, it is important to emphasize that the
statement, there are many studies, which taken together as a whole indicate that people
are overcondentis a very di¤erent, and weaker, statement than there are many studies,
each of which individually indicate that people are overcondent.
We emphasize that our goal is not so much to provide a concrete explanation for the
better-than-average data as much as it is to show that the data has been misinterpreted.
Thus, we have argued that even making the extreme, and possibly unrealistic, assumptions
that everybody knows the distribution of types in the population exactly, that they use
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Bayesrule perfectly, and that the subject pool is arbitrarily large, apparently overcondent
data can be generated. There is no need for recourse to errors of any kind. At the same time,
in keeping with our goal, we have accepted the experimental as given, although criticisms
could be made.42
Some psychologists will reject our approach out of hand, on the prior grounds that in-
dividuals do not use Bayes rule and, for that matter, may not even understand simple
probability. Even for these researchers, however, the basic challenge of this paper remains:
To indicate why a nding that a majority of people rank themselves above the median is
indicative of overcondence. If such a nding does not show overcondence in a Bayes
rational population, there can be no presumption that it indicates overcondence in a less
rational population.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We present the proof for the case in which the type space and
the signal space are nite; the proof when either is innite is technically more involved, but
the essential reasoning is the same.
Let p describe the distribution of types in the population. Suppose that person i is of type
^
i
; p

^
i

> 0; and that i has received the signal si. Since the posterior of i is degenerate,
there is a ei such that
Pr
ei j si = 1, Pr

si j eiPreiPn
i=1 Pr
 
si j iPr  i = 1
, 8 6= eis.t. p () > 0, Pr  si j i = 0:
Since only type ei receives the signal si with strictly positive probability, we have ^i = ei.
Thus, if beliefs are generated by a signalling model and these beliefs are degenerate, they
are correct, and it cannot be that more than half the population believes it is better than
the median.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix the population median data that is to be rationalized,
1 > x > 1=2 and x y < 1
2
  x
1+x
: We now dene the elements of a symmetric signalling
model that will , , and  rationalize the population data x. The signalling structure
consists of the signal space S = f0; 1g, the type space = 3x 1
2
; x; 1+x
2
	
, and the probability
42For instance, most researchers fail to determine whether subjects are comparing themselves to the
population median or mean. Also, the ecological validity of many experiments in unclear. In a slightly
di¤erent context Gigerenzer et al. (1997) write there is apparently not a single study on condence in
knowledge where a reference class has been dened and a representative (or random) sample of general-
knowledge questions has been drawn from this population.
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distributions f (1) = . The types are distributed in the population according to the prior p,
which assigns probability 2y to x, and 1
2
  y to each of 3x 1
2
and 1+x
2
. The expected fraction
of people who observe s = 1 is x. A person that observes 1 has a posterior belief given by
p ( j 1) =
8><>:
1+x
2x
 
1
2
  y  = 1+x
2
2y  = x
3x 1
2x
 
1
2
  y  = 3x 1
2
:
We now check that this posterior distribution (strictly) rst order stochastically dominates
the prior:
p

1 + x
2
j 1

=
1 + x
2x

1
2
  y

>
1
2
  y = p

1 + x
2

p (x j 1) = 2y = p (x)
p

3x  1
2
j 1

=
3x  1
2x

1
2
  y

<
1
2
  y = p

3x  1
2

Thus, the population ranking data x can be -rationalized.
To see that the population ranking data x can be -rationalized, notice that the posterior
mean of a person who observes 1 is strictly larger than the prior mean, x, which is also the
prior median.
To see that the population ranking data x can be -rationalized, notice that the posterior
median of a person that observes 1 is (1+x)
2
, since
p

1 + x
2
j 1

>
1
2
, 1 + x
2x

1
2
  y

>
1
2
, 1
2
  x
1 + x
> y
by construction. Furthermore, (1+x)
2
> x.
Proof of Theorem 2. Pick any 1 > x; q > 1=2. Let the signalling structure be given
by S = f0; 1g,  = 3x 1
2
; x; 1+x
2
	
, and f (1) = . On , dene a probability distribution
p that assigns probability 2q   1 to x, and 1   q to each of 3x 1
2
and 1+x
2
. Notice that the
fraction of the population whose type is at most x is q.
An observation of 1 occurs with probability x. A person that observes 1 has a posterior
belief given by
p ( j 1) =
8><>:
1+x
2x
(1  q)  = 1+x
2
2q   1  = x
3x 1
2x
(1  q)  = 3x 1
2
and an expected type that is strictly larger than x. Therefore, the expected fraction of people
who will have a mean type strictly greater than the fraction q of the population is x.
The case 0 < x; q < 1
2
is symmetrical, while the remaining cases are easy.
We prove necessity in Theorem 3 with a lemma that will be used elsewhere.
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Lemma 1 A fraction y or greater of a population can rationally believe that there is at least
a probability q that their types are: strictly better than the worse type in the top x% of the
population only if qy  x; weakly better than a type  such that p (  ) = x only if qy  x;
weakly worse than a type  such that p (  ) = x only if qy  x
Proof. For the rst claim, note that given p, the worse type in the top x% is  =
min fz : p (  z)  1  xg, which implies p ( > )  x: Let Sw  S be the set of signals s
such that p ( >  j s)  q; and let F denote the marginal distribution over signals so that
y = F (Sw). Then,
x  p ( > ) =
Z
p ( >  j s) dF (s) 
Z
Sw
p ( >  j s) dF (s) 
Z
Sw
qdF (s) = qy:
For the second claim, let Sw  S be the set of signals s such that p (   j s)  q; and
let F denote the marginal distribution over signals so that y = F (Sw). Then,
x = p (  ) =
Z
p (   j s) dF (s) 
Z
Sw
p (   j s) dF (s) 
Z
Sw
qdF (s) = qy:
The third claim is analogous to the second, and omitted.
We prove Theorem 3 using the following lemma, which we prove below.
Lemma 2 Let k be the simplex in Rk : k =

x 2 Rk : xi 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; :::; k;
P
xi = 1
	
.
Fix x 2 k and suppose that
kP
j=i
xj  2
k
(1 + k   i) , i =

k + 1
2

; :::; k and
iP
j=1
xj  2
k
i, i = 1; :::;

k   1
2

Then there exists a k  k matrix P; such that xP =   1
k
; :::; 1
k

; and for pi the ith row of P;
pi 2 k; Pij=1 pij  12 and Pkj=i pij  12 :
Proof of Theorem 3. Necessity. To prove necessity, simply apply claims 2 and 3 of
Lemma 1 with q = 1=2 and x = i=k for i = 1; 2; ::; k.
Su¢ ciency. Let P , pi be as in Lemma 2. Consider the following simple signalling
structure, S = f1; 2; :::; kg,  = [0; k], the distribution of the population is uniform over
the type space, and types in k cile j observe signal i with probability fj (i) = kpijxi, for
i; j = 1; :::; k.
Note the following:
1)
Pr
 
si

=
P
j Pr
 
si j k   cile jPr (j) =Pj kpijxi 1k =Pj pijxi = xiPj pij = xi,
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so that a fraction xi of the population see the signal j.
2)
Pr ( 2 k   cile j j s = i) = Pr (s
i j j) Pr (j)
Pr (si)
=
kpijxi
1
k
xi
= pij,
so that an individual who sees the signal i, ascribes the probability pij to being in k cile j.
3) Since
Pi
j=1 Pij =
Pi
j=1 p
i
j  12 and
Pk
j=i Pij =
Pk
j=i p
i
j  12 , the median type of an
individual that observes signal i is in k cile i.
1), 2), and 3) together imply the su¢ ciency part of the Theorem.
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix an x 2 k. We say that r 2 k can be justied if there exists
a k  k matrix Q; such that xQ = r; and for qi, the ith row of Q, qi 2 k, Pij=1Qij  12
and
Pk
j=iQij  12 : Let R be the set of distributions that can be justied. Note that R is
non-empty, since x itself can be justied by the identity matrix. Furthermore, R is closed
and convex. We need to show that
 
1
k
; :::; 1
k
 2 R.
Suppose not. Then, since f (t) =
t    1
k
; :::; 1
k
2 is a strictly convex function, there is
a unique
 
1
k
; :::; 1
k
 6= r = argmint2R f (t). Let Q be a matrix that justies r.
Since r 6=   1
k
; :::; 1
k

there exists some ri 6= 1k , and since r 2 k, there must be some
i for which ri > 1k , and some i for which ri <
1
k
. Let i = max

i : ri 6= 1k
	
and i =
min

i : ri 6= 1k
	
.
Step 1: We have ri ; ri <
1
k
.
Suppose instead that ri > 1k (a similar argument establishes that ri <
1
k
). Then, for all
j > i, rj = 1k and for some i < i
; ri < 1k . Let ei = maxi : ri < 1k	 : We show that for all
i > ei (a) for any j such that j  ei or j > i, either xj = 0 or Qji = 0; (b) either xi = 0 orPk
j=iQij =
1
2
:
To see (a) x an i0 >ei and suppose xj0 > 0 and Qj0i0 > 0 for some j0 ei or j0 > i0. Dene
the matrix eQ by eQj0ei = Qj0ei+"Qj0i0, eQj0i0 = (1  ")Qj0i0, and for all (f; g) =2 n(j0; i0) ;j0;eio,eQfg = Qfg . We have
For i 6= j0, Pij=1 ~Qij =Pij=1Qij  12 andPkj=i ~Qij =Pkj=iQij  12
If j0 ei, Pj0j=1 ~Qj0j =Pj0j=1Qij  12 andPkj=j0 ~Qij =Pkj=iQij + "Qj0i0   "Qj0i0  12
If i0 < j0,
Pj0
j=1
~Qj0j =
Pj0
j=1Qij + "Qj0i0   "Qj0i0  12 and
Pk
j=j0
~Qij =
Pk
j=iQij  12
9>=>; (i)
For " su¢ ciently small, dene er = x eQ.
We have erei = rei + xj0"Qj0i0, eri0 = ri0   xj0"Qj0i0, and for i =2 ni0;eio, eri = ri. ThereforePk
i=1 eri =Pkj=1 ri = 1. For small enough ", 1  eri0  0 for all i, since xj0 ; Qj0i0 > 0 implies
that ri0 > 0. Hence er 2 k and, given (i), er 2 R.
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We now show that f (~r) < f (r).
f (~r)  f (r) =

rei + xj0"Qj0i0   1k
2
 

rei   1k
2
+

ri0   xj0"Qj0i0   1
k
2
 

ri0   1
k
2
= (xj0"Qj0i0)
2 + 2xj0"Qj0i0

rei   1k

+ (xj0"Qj0i0)
2   2xj0"Qj0i0

ri0   1
k

= 2 (xj0"Qj0i0)

xj0"Qj0i0 + rei   1k   ri0 +
1
k

= 2 (xj0"Qj0i0) [xj0"Qj0i0 + rei   ri0 ]
Recall that r~{ < 1k , and since i
0 >ei, ri0  1k . Hence, for " su¢ ciently small, [xj0"Qj0i0 + rei   ri0 ] <
0. We have a contradiction, since, by denition r = argmint2R f (t).
To see (b), suppose that for some i0 > ei we have x0i0 > 0 and Pkj=i0 Qi0j > 12 . Pick
some j0  i0 with Qi0j0 > 0: For " su¢ ciently small, dene eQ by eQi0ei = Qi0ei + "Qi0j0,eQi0j0 = (1  ")Qi0j0 , and for all (f; g) =2 n(i0; j0) ;i0;eio, eQfg = Qfg . Dene er = x eQ. As
before, er 2 R and f (~r) < f (r), a contradiction.
Given (a) and (b), and recalling the dention of ei, we have
k  ei
k
<
Pk
t=ei+1 rt =
kX
t=ei+1
kX
j=1
xjQjt
=
kX
t=ei+1
kX
j=ei+1
xjQjt (by (a), j  ~{ implies xj = 0, or Qjt = 0)
=
kX
j=ei+1
xj
kX
t=ei+1
Qjt =
kX
j=ei+1
xj
kX
t=j
Qjt (by (a), j > t > ~{ implies xj = 0, or Qjt = 0)
=
kX
j=ei+1
xj
2
(by (b) either xj = 0 or
kX
t=j
Qjt =
1
2
)
 k  
ei
k
(by assumption of the Lemma)
Thus we have a contradiction.
Step 2: From Step 1 there exists an bi, i < bi < i, such that rbi > 1k . Since rbi =Pk
j=1 xjQjbi, for some j Qjbi > 0. We now show that this leads to a contradiction.
Consider a small enough ".
If j < bi, dene eQ by eQjbi = (1  ")Qjbi , eQji = Qji + "Qjbi, and for all (j; h) =2n
j;bi ; (j; i)o, eQjh = Qjh. If j > bi; dene eQ by: eQji = Qji + "Qjbi, eQjbi =
(1  ")Qjbi, and for all (j; h) =2
n
j;bi ; (j; i)o, eQjh = Q. In either case, for all i 6= j;
~Qij = Qij so
Pi
j=1
~Qij  12 and
Pk
j=i
~Qij  12 ; for i = j if j <bi; Pij=1 ~Qij =Pij=1Qij  12
and
Pk
j=i
~Qij =
Pk
j=iQij   "Qjbi + "Qjbi  12 ; for i = j if j > bi; Pij=1 ~Qij = Pij=1Qij  
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"Qjbi + "Qjbi  12 and Pkj=i ~Qij =Pkj=iQij  12 . For ~r = x eQ it is easy to show (as in Step
1) that f (er) < f (r) a contradiction.
If j = bi, Qjj > 0 and so Pjj=1 Qjj > 1=2 or Pkj=j Qjj > 1=2. Suppose thatPj
j=1 Qjj > 1=2 (an analogous argument can be made if
Pk
j=j Qjj > 1=2). Dene eQ
by eQji = Qji + "Qjj, eQjj = (1  ")Qjj, and for all (j; h) =2 f(j; j) , (j; i)geQjh = Qjh. One can then verify that for small enough "; for all i; Pij=1 ~Qij  12 andPk
j=i
~Qij  12 . Dening ~r = x eQ, we obtain f (er) < f (r) a contradiction.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let J = fj 2 f1; :::; kg jxj > 0g and write J = fs1; :::srg. We
dene a signalling model with n people, where n = ak for a 2 N; and a > 3k, individual i
is of type i; and the set of signals is fs1; :::srg. Dene fn r+j (sj) = 1 for j = 1; ::; r. For
i = 1; :::; n r, j = 1; 2; :::; r dene fi (sj) so that 1n
Pn
i=1 fi (sj) = xsj . We now describe the
types i in greater detail. First we x any numbers i such that i is strictly increasing in i
for i = 1; :::; n r and n 1
n
n r < 1. Considering only individuals 1; :::; n k, for i = 1; :::; k,
let mi be a median type of k-cile i (the kth k-cile is r members short of nk ).
Note that for j = 1; :::; r, p ( = n r+jjs = sj) =
1
n
xsj
 1
n
. Therefore,
Pn r
i=1 p ( = ijs = sj) i Pn r
i=1 p ( = ijs = sj) n r = n r
Pn r
i=1 p ( = ijs = j)  n r n 1n < 1 < msj . Set n r+j
so thatE (js = sj) =
Pn
i=1 p ( = ijs = sj) i =
Pn r
i=1 p ( = ijs = sj) i+p ( = n r+jjs = sj) n r+j 
msj and n r+j 6= i for all i 6= n r+j. Note that the types which form each k-cile may have
now shifted slightly, since we may have n r+j < n r for some j. However, since n > 3k2;
the number of types in each k cile is larger than 3k, so that msj is still in k-cile sj.
A person who sees signal sj has mean type E (js = sj)  msj . Therefore, a person who
sees signal sj has mean type in the jth k cile. Furthermore, a fraction xsj of the population
sees signal sj, and we are done.
Proof of Theorem 5. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 used symmetric testing models,
in which a signal of 1 is pass the test. Therefore, those proofs also prove this theorem.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose data
 
"; "; 1
2
  "; 1
2
  " = (x1; x2; x3; 1  x2   x3)
can be -rationalized by a signalling structure  = (S;; f) that satises mlrp. It can be
shown that it is w.l.o.g. to assume that S = (1; 2; 3; 4) and that a person who sees signal
i = 1; 2; 3; 4 declares himself to be of type i. Since  satises mlrp, f1 (4)  f2 (4)  f3 (4).
Since the signalling structure rationalizes the data, the expected number of people who
observe signal j is xj. Hence
4X
i=1
fi (1) = 4x1;
4X
i=1
fi (2) = 4x2 and
4X
i=1
fi (3) = 4x3
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Since those who observe signal s = 4 believe their median type is in quartile 4, we have
1  f4 (1)  f4 (2)  f4 (3)
4 P4i=1 fi (1) P4i=1 fi (2) P4i=1 fi (3)  12
4X
i=1
fi (1) +
4X
i=1
fi (2) +
4X
i=1
fi (3)  2 + 2f4 (1) + 2f4 (2) + 2f4 (3) (1)
Since those who observe signal s = 3 believe their median type is in quartile 3, we have
f3 (3) + f4 (3)P4
i=1 fi (3)
 1
2
2f3 (3) + 2f4 (3) 
4X
i=1
fi (3) (2)
f3 (3) + f4 (3)  f1 (3) + f2 (3) (3)
Inequalities (1) and (2) together imply
2f3 (3) + 2f4 (3) 
4X
i=1
fi (3)  2 + 2f4 (1) + 2f4 (2) + 2f4 (3) 
4X
i=1
fi (1) 
4X
i=1
fi (2)
f3 (3)  2 + f4 (1) + f4 (2) 
P3
i=1 fi (1) 
P3
i=1 fi (2)
2
:
Thus
f3 (4) = 1  f3 (1)  f3 (2)  f3 (3)
 1  f3 (1)  f3 (2)  2 + f4 (1) + f4 (2) 
P3
i=1 fi (1) 
P3
i=1 fi (2)
2
=
f1 (1) + f2 (1)  f3 (1)  f4 (1) + f1 (2) + f2 (2)  f3 (2)  f4 (2)
2
Given that f1 (4)  f2 (4)  f3 (4), we have
f1 (4)  f2 (4)  f3 (4)  f1 (1) + f2 (1)  f3 (1)  f4 (1) + f1 (2) + f2 (2)  f3 (2)  f4 (2)
2
(4)
From 4, and since
P4
j=1 fi (j) = 1 for any i,
f1 (3) + f2 (3) = 2  (f1 (1) + f2 (1))  (f1 (2) + f2 (2))  (f1 (4) + f2 (4))
 2  (f1 (1) + f2 (1))  (f1 (2) + f2 (2))
  (f1 (1) + f2 (1)  f3 (1)  f4 (1) + f1 (2) + f2 (2)  f3 (2)  f4 (2))
= 2  2 (f1 (1) + f2 (1))  2 (f1 (2) + f2 (2)) + f3 (1) + f4 (1) + f3 (2) + f4 (2) ()
Since
P4
i=1 fi (j) = 4xj for any j we have that
() = 2  2 (4x1   f3 (1)  f4 (1))  2 (4x2   f3 (2)  f4 (2)) + f3 (1) + f4 (1) + f3 (2) + f4 (2)
= 2  8x1   8x2 + 3 (f3 (1) + f4 (1) + f3 (2) + f4 (2))
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Given 3, we obtain
f3 (3) + f4 (3)  f1 (3) + f2 (3)
 2  8x1   8x2 + 3 (f3 (1) + f4 (1) + f3 (2) + f4 (2))  2  8x1   8x2:
4x3 =
4X
i=1
fi (3)  4  16 (x1 + x2)
4

1
2
  "

 4  16 (2")
"  1
14
Proof of Theorem 6. Let p be the distribution of types in the population and Pr (s)
be the probability that someone sees the signal s. We have
X
s
Pr (s) p ( = tjs) =
X
s
(X

p () f (s)
)
ft (s) p (t)P
 f (s) p ()
=
X
s
ft (s) p (t) = p (t)
Let t (s) =
P
t tp ( = tjs). Then
E (t (s)) =
X
s
Pr (s) t (s) =
X
s
Pr (s)
 X
t
tp ( = tjs)
!
=
X
t
t
X
s
Pr (s) p ( = tjs) =
X
t
tp (t) = E (p) :
By denition E (p) = m. Hence, E (t (s)) = E (p) = m, and E
 
1
n
Pn
i=1
ti

= m; as was to
be shown.
Proof of Theorem 7. Necessity is proved by the rst claim in Lemma 1. For su¢ ciency
take any q; y and x such that qy  x: Let the type space be  = [0; 1] ; let the population
be distributed uniformly on [0; 1] ; and let S = f0; 1g :
If y  x let the signalling structure be such that f (1) = y x1 x for   1 x; and f (1) = 1
for  > 1   x. Recall that a type z is in the top x% of the population if p (  z)  1   x;
so the worst type in the top x% is 1  x and p ( > 1  x) = x: Then,
p ( > 1  x j s = 1) = Pr (1 j  > 1  x) p ( > 1  x)
Pr (1 j  > 1  x) p ( > 1  x) + Pr (1 j   1  x) p (  1  x)
=
x
x+ (1  x) y x
1 x
=
x
y
 q:
If y < x; let the signalling structure be such that f (1) = 0 for   1  y; and f (1) = 1
for  > 1  y. Then, y% observe signal 1 and
p ( > 1  x j s = 1) = 0 + p ( > 1  y j s = 1) = y=y = 1  q
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as was to be shown.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a signalling structure (S; = (1; :::; n) ; f) and
population distribution p with median m and a fraction  of types strictly greater than m.
For any  < 1
2
and distribution q over  that is -close to being degenerate, let  (q) 2  be
such that q ( (q))  1  . Note that  (q) is the median of q. Also, there exists a  such
that if  <  then for any distribution q whose mean is greater than m, we have  (q) > m,
and for any distribution q whose mean is less than or equal to m, we have  (q)  m. Set t
and  < , such that  < (1  ) ( + "+ t  1) and 1   < (1  ) (t   + ") :
Let (p j s) denote the posterior of p given s; and dene S ={s 2 S : (p j s) is -close
to degenerate}, S^m = fs 2 S : median of (p j s) > mg, Sm = fs 2 S :  ((p j s)) > mg,
S^ = fs 2 S : (p j s) has mean > mg and S = fs 2 S : (p j s) has mean > mg.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that P (S)  t and P

S^m

= xm  + ". Note that
P (Sm)  xm   (1  t). We have
 = P f > mg =
X
s
P ( > m j s)P (s) 
X
Sm
P ( > m j s)P (s)

X
Sm
(1  )P (s) = (1  )
X
Sm
P (s) = (1  )P (Sm)  (1  ) (xm   1 + t)
 (1  ) ( + "  1 + t)
which is a contradiction. A similar argument establishes a contradiction if we assume that
P

S^

= x   + ", (with S playing the role of Sm).
Let S^m = fs 2 S : median of (p j s)  mg, Sm = fs 2 S :  ((p j s))  mg and suppose
that P

S^m

= xm     ". Then,
1   = P f  mg =
X
s
P (  m j s)P (s) 
X
Sm
P (  m j s)P (s)

X
Sm
(1  )P (s) = (1  )
X
Sm
P (s) = (1  )P (sm)  (1  ) (1  xm   1 + t)
 (1  ) (t  xm)  (1  ) (t   + ") ;
which is a contradiction. Again, the argument for x is similar.
The proof of Theorem 8 is a corollary of the following lemma, versions of which are well
known (see Wolfstetter (1999) Chapter 4). We will use the strict inequalities in this version
of our lemma, and in addition we do not require that the probability distribution has a
density.
Lemma 3 The posterior after passing a test fosd the prior, which fosd the posterior after
failing the test. Moreover, letting n denote a fail, y a pass, and letting p be the population
distribution, for any x such that 1 > p (  x) > 0,
p (  x j n) > p (  x) and p (  x) > p (  x j y)
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Proof of Lemma 3. We only compare the prior to the posterior after n; since the
comparison between the prior and the posterior after y is symmetric. From BayesRule we
must show that
p (  x j n) =
R x
0
(1  z) dp (z)R 1
0
(1  z) dp (z) 
R x
0
dp (z) = p (  x)
, R x
0
"
1  zR 1
0
(1  z) dp (z)   1
#
dp (z)  0
, R x
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dp (z)  0 (5)
and that the inequality is strict whenever p (  x) > 0. First notice that for any x 
E (), the last inequality is trivially satised. The integrand in the last inequality is strictly
decreasing in z, and is 0 for z = E () : If for some x > E () we hadR x
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dp (z) < 0; (6)
then for any x0 > x we would also haveR x0
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dp (z) < 0;
since E() z
1 E() < 0 for all z > x > E (). But this contradicts
R 1
0
E() z
1 E()dp (z) =
E() E()
1 E() dp (z) =
0:
Now let us turn to the strict inequalities. Pick any x  E () ; with 1 > p (  x) > 0: If
x = E () ; we know that p ( < x) > 0 (because p is non degenerate), and since the integrand
in inequality (5) is strictly positive for all z < E (), we must have that the integral is strictly
positive, as was to be shown. If x < E () ; the strictly positive integrand and p (  x) > 0
ensure that the integral is also strictly positive.
Pick any x > E () ; and assume thatR x
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dp (z)  0:
Since 1 > p (  x) holds, we must have p ( > x) > 0: But then, E() z
1 E() < 0 for all z  x >
E () and p ( > x) > 0 imply that
0 =
R 1
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dp (z) =
R x
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dp (z) + infw>x
R 1
w
E ()  z
1  E ()dp (z)
 0 + inf
w>x
R 1
w
E ()  z
1  E ()dp (z) < 0
which is a contradiction.
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Proof of Theorem 8. Let y denote passing the test, and n denote failing it. We will
develop the arguments for the posterior after y; since those for n are analogous. By Lemma
3, the posterior p ( j y) strictly fosd the population distribution, which implies that the
posterior mean is strictly larger than the prior mean, which is also the median by symmetry.
Let m be the population median. By Lemma 3, the fraction E () who observe y consider
that their median type is weakly larger than the population median. Suppose rst that the
population distribution has a density. Then,
p (  m j y) =
R m
0
dp
E ()
<
m
R m
0
dp
E ()
=
mp (  m)
E ()
= p (  m) = 1
2
so that m is no longer the median belief of a person who has seen y. As we know, the
persons median belief is weakly larger than m, so in fact it must be strictly larger.
If the distribution does not have a density, assume that p (m) is small enough that
p (m)m+ p ( < m)E ( j  < m) < m=2
Then,
p (  m) =
Z m
0
dp  1
2
>
p (m)m+ p ( < m)E ( j  < m)
m
=
R m
0
dp
E ()
= p (  m j y)
and again which establishes that m is not a median of the posterior after y:
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